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# Superforecasting
- URL: https://ishangirdhar.com/superforecasting/
- Published: 2026-11-10T18:17:27.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-16T19:35:12.000Z
- Description: by Philip Tetlock, Dan Gardner
- Author: Ishan Girdhar
- Tags: Books, #reading-list, #audiobook

## About the book

From one of the world's most highly regarded social scientists, a transformative book on the habits of mind that lead to the best predictions.

Everyone would benefit from seeing further into the future, whether buying stocks, crafting policy, launching a new product, or simply planning the week's meals. Unfortunately people tend to be terrible forecasters. As Wharton professor Philip Tetlock showed in a landmark 2005 study, even experts' predictions are only slightly better than chance. However, an important and underreported conclusion of that study was that some experts do have real foresight, and Tetlock has spent the past decade trying to figure out why. What makes some people so good? And can this talent be taught?

In *Superforecasting*, Tetlock and coauthor Dan Gardner offer a masterwork on prediction, drawing on decades of research and the results of a massive, government-funded forecasting tournament. The Good Judgment Project involves tens of thousands of ordinary people - including a Brooklyn filmmaker, a retired pipe installer, and a former ballroom dancer - who set out to forecast global events. Some of the volunteers have turned out to be astonishingly good. They've beaten other benchmarks, competitors, and prediction markets. They've even beaten the collective judgment of intelligence analysts with access to classified information. They are "superforecasters".

In this groundbreaking and accessible book, Tetlock and Gardner show us how we can learn from this elite group. Superforecasting offers the first demonstrably effective way to improve our ability to predict the future - whether in business, finance, politics, international affairs, or daily life - and is destined to become a modern classic.

## Highlights that stuck

> I also didn’t mind because the joke makes a valid point. Open any newspaper, watch any TV news show, and you find experts who forecast what’s coming. Some are cautious. More are bold and confident. A handful claim to be Olympian visionaries able to see decades into the future. With few exceptions, they are not in front of the cameras because they possess any proven skill at forecasting. Accuracy is seldom even mentioned. Old forecasts are like old news—soon forgotten—and pundits are almost never asked to reconcile what they said with what actually happened. The one undeniable talent that talking heads have is their skill at telling a compelling story with conviction, and that is enough.

> The one undeniable talent that talking heads have is their skill at telling a compelling story with conviction, and that is enough.

> But I realized that as word of my work spread, its apparent meaning was mutating. What my research had shown was that the average expert had done little better than guessing on many of the political and economic questions I had posed. “Many” does not equal all. It was easiest to beat chance on the shortest-range questions that only required looking one year out, and accuracy fell off the further out experts tried to forecast—approaching the dart-throwing-chimpanzee level three to five years out. That was an important finding. It tells us something about the limits of expertise in a complex world—and the limits on what it might be possible for even superforecasters to achieve.

> In 1972 the American meteorologist Edward Lorenz wrote a paper with an arresting title: “Predictability: Does the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set Off a Tornado in Texas?” A decade earlier, Lorenz had discovered by accident that tiny data entry variations in computer simulations of weather patterns—like replacing 0.506127 with 0.506—could produce dramatically different long-term forecasts. It was an insight that would inspire “chaos theory”: in nonlinear systems like the atmosphere, even small changes in initial conditions can mushroom to enormous proportions.

> So is reality clocklike or cloud-like? Is the future predictable or not? These are false dichotomies, the first of many we will encounter. We live in a world of clocks and clouds and a vast jumble of other metaphors. Unpredictability and predictability coexist uneasily in the intricately interlocking systems that make up our bodies, our societies, and the cosmos. How predictable something is depends on what we are trying to predict, how far into the future, and under what circumstances.

> How predictable something is depends on what we are trying to predict, how far into the future, and under what circumstances.

> have been struck by how important measurement is to improving the human condition,” Bill Gates wrote. “You can achieve incredible progress if you set a clear goal and find a measure that will drive progress toward that goal….This may seem basic, but it is amazing how often it is not done and how hard it is to get right.”

> That’s the problem. Cochrane didn’t doubt the specialist and the specialist didn’t doubt his own judgment and so neither man considered the possibility that the diagnosis was wrong and neither thought it wise to wait for the pathologist’s report before closing the books on the life of Archie Cochrane. But we shouldn’t judge them too harshly. It’s human nature. We have all been too quick to make up our minds and too slow to change them. And if we don’t examine how we make these mistakes, we will keep making them. This stagnation can go on for years. Or a lifetime. It can even last centuries, as the long and wretched history of medicine illustrates.

> Whether intuition generates delusion or insight depends on whether you work in a world full of valid cues you can unconsciously register for future use. “For example, it is very likely that there are early indications that a building is about to collapse in a fire or that an infant will soon show obvious symptoms of infection,” Kahneman and Klein wrote. “On the other hand, it is unlikely that there is publicly available information that could be used to predict how well a particular stock will do—if such valid information existed, the price of the stock would already reflect it.

> In intelligence circles, Sherman Kent is a legend. With a PhD in history, Kent left a faculty position at Yale to join the Research and Analysis Branch of the newly created Coordinator of Information (COI) in 1941\. The COI became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The OSS became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). By the time Kent retired from the CIA in 1967, he had profoundly shaped how the American intelligence community does what it calls intelligence analysis—the methodical examination of the information collected by spies and surveillance to figure out what it means, and what will happen next.

57 highlights in my Readwise library; these are the ones I keep coming back to.